MACVSOG - Command History Annexes A,N & M
1. In March 1964 MACSOG advised -- Deleted - [Batservice Verft A/S (Boatservice A/S Ltd.)] that fuel cell tank #9 ruptured along a weld on its out- board side. Also, Tanks #8 and #9 shifted fore and aft due to loose strapping. Further, new tanks #2 and #3, and #9 vertically buckled on the inboard side above the horizontal weld. MACSOG evaluation was that new tanks with square edges do not provide sufficient strength for securing without modification. It was recommended that a representative -- Deleted -- [Boatservice A/S] visit and investigate the problems.
2. According to the above request, a -- Deleted - [Boatservice A/S] representative visited -- Deleted - and reported findings recommending installation of new style tank manufactured in Subic on PTFs 3 through 8.
3. CINCPAC passed fuel tank problems to CINCPAC and BUSHIPS and informed all that the installation recommendation in paragraph 2 above was underway.
4. NAVSHIPREPFAC [Naval Ship Repair Facility] -- Deleted -- notified BUSHIPS [Bureau of Ships] that the -- Words Illegible -- on PTF 2 tumbles during high accelerations or heavy pounding. Similar problems encountered in PTF 1 were solved by a change to -- Words Illegible -- Early resolution of problem was requested.
5. MACSOG informed -- Deleted -- [Boatservice A/S Ltd.] that the quill saline shaft sheared on #1 engine on PTF 1 and #4 engine on PTF 2. Spare parts from PTF 2 were cannibalized to make PTF 1 operational.
6. MACSOG requested that enlarged heat exchangers be installed at -- Deleted -- [Boatservice A/S Ltd.] for PTFs 3 and 4. Another query was dispatched to -- Deleted -- [Boatservice A/S] requesting plans for installing heat exchangers on PTFs 3 and 4 as well as PTFs 5 and 6, which had arrived without exchangers.
7. MACSOG advised -- Deleted -- [Napier-Deltic, a British engine manufacturer] that the starboard engine on PTF 3 failed to turnover and that coolant water was found in engine block. Repairs were beyond capacity of MST and the engine would be returned to -- Deleted -- [Napier-Deltic]. Engine had 200 hours time, serial #523, installed in -- Deleted -- [Napier-Deltic] with one year guarantee or 750 running hours. Further, message requested status of spare Deltic engines at Subic.
8. MACSOG expressed concern to -- Deleted - [Napier] with high noise level of the PTFs. In reply -- Deleted -- [Napier] stated that the turbo- supercharger is the major source of boat noise, exhaust noise being reduced to minimum by exhaust through an eight inch pipe. Further isolation of super-charger noise was not considered practical by manufacturer's representative.
9. On 21 May, MACSOG advised CINCPACFLT that PTF engine noise was excessive and requested authority to conduct initial investigation on PTFs 7 and 8 to determine feasibility of an economical lightweight installation designed to reduce engine noise level.
10. CINCPACFLT passed MACSOG's desires to BUSHIPS requesting comments and recommendations. Accordingly, BUSHIPS advised it and no -- Word Illegible -- to -- Deleted -- conducting tests provided -- Deleted -- [Napier] representative concurred that any solution considered would not adversely affect engine performance.
11. MACSOG advised -- Deleted -- on 9 June that it appeared that above tests would be drawn out and that delay of delivery of PTFs was not acceptable.
12. MACSOG proposed to commence overhaul of PTFs by starting with PTF 3, sea lifting it from -- Deleted -- approximately 1 December 1964 to -- Deleted -- MACSOG further stated overhaul schedule of first four PTFs should be based on overhaul experience for PTF 3. Overhaul was estimated to be 30 days.
[Possibly refers to Maritime Studies Branch, MACSOG-31/Maritime Studies Group, MACSOG-37. SOG's repair facilities in Da Nang were located at Lower Base, which was approximately 3 miles NW of Camp Fay. NAD Mobile Support Teams and Mobile Training Teams provided logistics support for the boats through liaison with the Navy Special Programs Office at Ship Repair Facility, Naval Supply Depot, Subic Bay.]
b. PTF administrative/logistical function for PTFs in RVN were delegated to -- Deleted -- in accordance with CINCPACFLT.
c. Assignments of governing procedures and responsibilities for PTF support were established by CINCPACFLT.
2. In order to clarify responsibilities CINCPACFLT informed COMNAVPHIL and COMSEVENTHFLT that the responsibility for assembly of drydock package, supervising instruction of personnel, evaluation of number of propulsion units required for crane barge, preparation for movement to and mooring at, final site and administrative/ logistical functions for pontoon package in RVN was assigned to COMNAVPHIL vice COMSEVENTHFLT. COMSEVENTHFLT would continue provide assembly personnel and drydock transportation to mooring site.
3. MACSOG as to arrangements for refueling PTFs 1 and 2 with AVGAS.
4. MACSOG advised CINCPACFLT that an interim measure for refueling PTFs 1 and 2 would be by AVGAS truck on the beach as a base, with craft moored 100 yards offshore. Also, MACSOG stated that fuel farm completion might be delayed if resolution of finding problem by higher authority not forthcoming soon. A contract with low bidder was also completed but not signed. ESSO required a contract and estimated six weeks for completion after receipt of a contract.
[Chieu-ESSO maintained a large fuel storage facility north and across the bay from Da Nang.]
5. CINCPACFLT indicated readiness to assist in test, development, and procurement of special PTF ordnance support materials if requirements were made known. These requirements were provided by the following Top Secret messages:
6. MACSOG confirmed to CINCPAC a requirement for a T-14 swimmer propulsion unit.
7. MACSOG reviewed and restated prior voluminous message traffic on PTF ordnance support requirements.
8. CINCPACFLT scheduled a Navy-wide maritime operations conference at -- Deleted - [either Hawaii or Subic] for 12-13 October which was attended by MACV (Director) of Operations, Maritime Operations, and -- Words Illegible - conference, general maritime operations support problems -- Words Illegible -- as a result, NAD weekly summaries of significant unfilled requisitions related to not only maritime operations ordnance equipment but also to general support material and PTF (MST) support material.
9. MACSOG requested CJNCPAC/CINCPACFLT assistance in:
b. Providing D... [?] radar cosal and cosal stacks.
c. Shortening lead times in responding to PTF radar/gyro repair and repair part needs.
d. Expediting procurement and -- Deleted - delivery of PTF repair parts let by -- Deleted -
MACSOG requested an enlisted electronics technician at -- Deleted -- assist in overcoming electronic problems. One was subsequently provided.
10. CINCPACFLT questioned whether significant PTF support degradation had occurred. MACSOG replied that degradation had not occurred but that some repair parts problems existed which could be subject of SOG representatives visit to -- Deleted - on 6 November 1964.
1l. CINCPACFLT recommended establishment of a PTF casualty reporting system to improve support. MACSOG concurred and system placed in effect.
12. MACSOG proposed reliefs for key maritime operations officer personnel at -- Deleted -- to fulfill prescribed language, security, preparatory briefing, and instruction requirements.
13. MACSOG requested CINCPAC initiate Navy action to terminate security breach of unclassified message references to U.S. PTFs. CINCPAC (complied) and implemented.
14. MACSOG representatives -- Deleted -- and team -- Words Illegible -- in solving radar and gyro problems. On 24 November installation of De(ros) 202 radar was completed in Swifts plus PTFs 5-8 and additional gyro material ordered from Subic.
15. A favorable comparison was achieved between recently obtained T-14 SPU [Swimmer Propulsion Unit] characteristics with previously stated MACSOG required characteristics. A message stated special SPU maintenance personnel could return to CONUS and NAD personnel would maintain SPUs cannibalizing two SPUs to keep the other four operational.
16. MACSOG received -- Deleted -- and - Deleted -- letters which contained debriefs of SHF electrical, mechanical, and electronic inspections on PTF. These letters requested authority to debrief MACSOG personnel in connection with PTF material support, MACSOG considered such authority already provided and requested that forth- coming -- Deleted -- improvement recommendations to MACSOG on:
b. Engineering operating.
c. Casualty control.
d. -- Deleted -- PTF logistical support.
1. In addition to ground security augmentation, MACSOG requested special support from CNO to improve -- Deleted -- [Naval Advisory Detachment] defense. Equipment arrived -- Deleted -- [NAD] in October 1964 and was unsatisfactory.
[The U.S. Naval Advisory Detachment controlled five camps and two beaches on a rocky peninsula Southeast of the city of Da Nang. Camp Fay was the principal berthing area for all personnel assigned to NAD and Monkey Mountain Forward Operating Base (MMFOB). Lower Base, approximately 3 miles NW from Camp Fay, was the operational base of NAD and the Coastal Security Service. In-country craft were docked at three pontoon piers.
Upper Base, located across the road from Lower Base, contained facilities for the CSS. Camp Black Rock, located 1 mile east from Camp Fay, housed the U.S. Navy SEALs. Nung Camp was located adjacent to Upper Base, and contained additional CSS and CIDG facilities. Coral Beach, near Camp Black Rock, contained a pistol and rifle range, grenade/mortar area, and infiltration training area. Spanish Beach, near Nung Camp, contained three magazines for ammunition and demolitions storage. MACSOG, with considerable assets hugging the coastline of Da Nang, was correct to worry about defenses.]
2. MACSOG requested CINCPACFLT representative, knowledgeable in harbor defenses, to survey - Deleted -- [NAD] defense needs and assist in arriving at an in-country resolution.
3. CINCPAC requested concept (in event surface craft attack -- Deleted --) [NAD] for PTF role in passive protection or active defense. MACSOG submitted the following concept:
(2) Operate in assigned sections to avoid mistaken identity. [To avoid the possibility of the South Vietnamese VNN/CSS panicking and opening fire on SOG craft.]
(3) U.S. OTC on PTFs involved in operations -- Deleted -- [Above the 17th parallel. No CSS craft left port without Americans aboard to keep an eye on the Vietnamese and, more importantly, keep them pointed in the right direction.]
(4) If provided, use US/VN naval and air support with appropriate communications and coordination.
(2) Surveillance by PTF/Swift craft and base personnel to repel attack from land and sea.
4. MACSOG reported to CINCPAC that the CINCPACFLT survey was completed on 16 December with its report to be hand-carried to CINCPACFLT. MACSOG also stated that some aspects of the survey were being implemented and that assistance would be requested from CINCPAC at a later date.
[If the report was hand-carried it was probably classified Top
Secret. Top Secret documents can only be transmitted by:
5. -- Deleted -- [Naval Advisory Detachment] requested firm decision on disposition of PTF 1 and PTF 2 in view of extreme difficulty -- Deleted - [CSS] in providing supply and maintenance support. Officer in charge previously recommended PTFs and 2 be used in -- Deleted -- [Harbor] security patrol, limited to operations/training missions in which MACSOG concurred, and that this status continue until the crews of PTFs 1 and 2 transferred to new PTFs at -- Deleted -- [NAD].
[PTFs 1 and 2 were later sunk as targets.]
1. In October 1964, MACSOG stated that the time was not ripe to lease PTFs to the Government of Vietnam; although CNO indicated prior to 34A operations, PTFs should be leased.
2. CINCPAC emphasized the need for MACSOG to complete the PTF leases.
3. COMUSMACV indicated lease discussions had progressed to point where CINCPAC legal assistance was required.
[The most productive branches on the Studies and Observations Group tree were the Maritime Operations Sections and Maritime Operations Group, later designated Maritime Studies Branch (MA CSOG-3I~ and Maritime Studies Group (MA CSOG-31). From 1964 through 1965 Maritime operations were the unchallenged stars of the show, with the Air Force bombing programs in Laos (Barrel Roll) and attacks on North Vietnam (Rolling Thunder) running a close second. Later assessments of the bombing missions would conclude that they did little to deter the North Vietnamese war-making potential, but like the naval operations, at least it looked as if we were doing something significant.
The Maritime star would soon be eclipsed by SOG's ground operations in Laos, Cambodia, the DMZ, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. But in 1964-6~ the Maritime Operations Section was riding high.
Much of the success of the Maritime program was due to the fact that U.S. naval forces had been operating in Vietnamese waters since the mid-fifties, and had, by that time, determined what would work and what wouldn't.
One of the early, little known naval operations conducted was named Operation: Exodus, in which Dr. Tom Dooley was to win fame. Exodus involved sea lifting refugees fleeing south after the signing of the Accords that divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel. The Navy lifted over 300,000 persons to safety. In all, 900,000 refugees fled from North to South, and 100,000from South to North.
OPLAN 34A maritime operations had been presaged by DeSoto intelligence-gathering patrols conducted in international waters above the 17th parallel, and many historians believe the Tonkin Gulf incident, in which the USS Maddox and Turner Joy were attacked by NVN gunboats, was triggered by an earlier 34A raid. The attack on the Turner Joy may never have taken place, but the attack on the Maddox provided all the justification the President need to push through the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. By the time the war ended, more than 2.5 million Americans had moved through South Vietnam, thanks, in part, to MACV-SOG and the actions of a few PTFs operating above the 17th parallel in 1964.
Maritime operations under OPLAN 34A, however, represented nothing significantly new. These had been underway since October 4, 1964. Assignments for the Maritime Operations Group included 15 missions involving shore bombardments, a junk capture, a kidnap mission, and a demolition sortie against a coastal highway bridge.
Soon after the decision had been made to commit U.S. assets to the 34A program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked COMUSMACV with developing a revised December 1964 34A operations schedule to better reflect the newly adopted concept of applying ever increasing pressure on North Vietnam. CINCPAC was requested to submit revised 34A plans not later than 8 December.
The instructions specified that these plans were to include a proposed sequence and timing for increased frequency of maritime operations in two packages.
The first was to begin on December 15, extend over a period of 30 days, and provide for shallow penetration raids by UDT/SEAL personnel on ad types of targets which would provide the greatest psychological benefits. Package Two added 4 to 6 U.S aircraft to the program to afford protective cover and incorporate action against certain North Vietnamese coastal targets above the 19th parallel.
MACV's new proposal for maritime operations was submitted on 5 December, with proposals for psychological operations and aerial resupply/reinforce missions following close behind. On the 10th, approval for the latter two was communicated back to the field. At the time, MAROPS proposals were still under consideration within the JCS.
On the 12th, the JCS submitted their two-package proposal. Included in their first 30-day package were coastal bombardment of radar sites, barracks, and PT boat bases plus a maritime equivalent of aerial armed reconnaissance. Patrol boats would make fire sweeps along the coast against targets of opportunity. In addition, upon their return from bombardment missions, it was proposed that the GVN PT boats attempt the capture of NVN junks and
With the single exception of the coastal fire sweeps, all of these initial package operations were approved by the OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), and instructions were issued to implement the initial increment of such operations on or about IS December.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that without the fire sweeps, there would be no additional pressure on North Vietnam. Plans were overtaken by nature. Heavy seas throughout the month of December 1964 and January 1965 had effectively cancelled all MAROPS. By February of 1965 they were still on hold.]
1. Summary of Operations
b. Separately scheduled Nasty Class PTF and/or Swift mission interdiction mission wherein NVN vessels in patrol area are stopped and searched. -- Remainder Deleted -
[The deleted section probably deals with operation Sea Dragon, also known as Traffic Cop. This was a program of interdiction of North Vietnamese coastal shipping 17:OO N to 18: OO N. The Traffic Cop phase consisted of Destroyer operations against coastal shipping of NVN 17:OO N to 18:OO N. Other missions utilized the PTFs to intercept and destroy infiltration trawlers that had been designated a threat by CINCPAC, conduct bombardment of designated transshipment points and storage areas along the coast of North Vietnam, and the destruction of the North Vietnamese fishing industry along the coast of North Vietnam.
SOG also conducted in-country cross-beach operations, called Dewey Rifle (or Dodge Mark), Insistence operations, which were conducted in coordination with Market Time (NAVFORV) to prevent infiltration by sea into South Vietnam, and Footboy (formerly Plowman), which dealt with the infiltration and support of agents in North Vietnam.]
[The North Vietnamese coastal defense forces SOG mentions were equipped with Soviet and Red Chinese radar, missiles and artillery.]
On 12 August 1965 -- Name Deleted -- was assigned to duty as the Targeting Officer for MAROPS. His assignment expedited procurement of adequate intelligence for planning MAROPS missions and provided expert photo interpretation services on a prompt and continuing basis.
-- Sections 2 through 6 Deleted -
(7) The floating drydock at USNAD, in spite all possible preventative maintenance, deteriorated to the extent that it was necessary to send it to the Ship Repair Facility, Japan, on 25 August. It was overhauled and returned to USNAD on 27 October.
[According to Jane's Fighting Ships, 1974-75, the USNAD drydock was designated AFDL-23. Built in 1944, it weighed 1,900 tons and was constructed of steel. Some drydocks in the AFDL series had concrete hulls. All AFDLs were constructed between 1943 and 1944. AFDL-22 was loaned to South Vietnam.]
(8) Planning/coordination/liaison conferences and visits between MAROPS and USNAD personnel occurred frequently throughout the year with a resultant increase in proficiency, unity of purpose and effort. -- Paragraph Deleted -
(9) Unsatisfactory characteristics of various items of boat -- Words Deleted -- imposed operational limitations. Corrective action was initiated and close supervision maintained. A conference was held CINCPAC HQ during December which was concerned with this problem area. The Chief, Operations, and Chief, MAROPS from SOG, and the Assistant Training Officer, USNAD attended this conference which dealt with the following:
(b) Need for specific details regarding equipment characteristics or purpose, to aid R & D of certain items
(c) Determination of on-shelf procurement vice R & D.
(d) Priority based on operational need.
[The PTFs were undergoing almost constant modification during 1964-65. Added to SOGs Iist of concerns was the inability of South Vietnamese repair personnel to properly maintain the boats.]
(10) Provision of adequate logistical support of USNAD continued to be a problem; supply sources, transportation, long distances and items peculiar to MAROPS all being contributory factors. SOG Logistics was cognizant of, and continually devoted its best efforts to solving these problems. -- Section Illegible -
(12) Close coordination was continually effected with 7th Air Force and Naval Advisory Group regarding matters pertaining to OPLAN 34A, Market Time, and Fleet operations. Close liaison was maintained with Vietnamese counterpart personnel with adjacent and support augmentation units.
(13) A civic action program initiated to aid destitute Vietnamese nationals in close proximity to USNAD facilities was gratefully received. The success of this program was such that it was placed on a continuing basis.
[SOG was not being generous or considerate of the plight of the locals. The civic action program was designed to keep the people happy and, hopefully, out of the grasp of the Viet Cong. Up until the end of the war, SOG never realized that the Marble Mountain area of Da Nang had been heavily infiltrated by Viet Cong.]
(14) The massive -- Words Deleted -
(15)-- Words Deleted -- awarded the following citation army degree, to the Vietnamese personnel of the Coastal Security Service (CSS) at USNAD effective 24 September 1965:
"Since its formation on April first 1964, the Coastal Security
Service has performed an efficient job and achieved -- Words Deleted --
missions behind enemy lines, inflicting heavy casualties:
[Compare SOGs glowing words about the CSS with (a) below. Perhaps this schizophrenic section has something to do with the fact that the CSS was organized on April Fool's Day.]
2. Training Activities
(1) Boat Crew Training. Refresher training was accomplished whenever operational requirements and boat availability permitted. Particular emphasis was placed on Vietnamese crew boat maintenance and underway repairs. Individual and multiple boat tactics and gunnery were also stressed.
(2)- Deleted -
3. Facility Improvement
b. Other new and isolated individual training camps were built along China Beach including the facility constructed at Camp Black Rock Bay. This base was highly desirable due to the buildup of American forces in the area, as well as affording an opportunity for close supervision of Landing Teams. Quarters were completed with the exception of installation of messing and sanitary facilities, so the consolidation had to be delayed until this was ac- sometime during early 1966.
c. Continual efforts were made to improve the security and comfort of existing facilities. Windows in the Command Post were closed with concrete blocks, better fencing was installed, trenches and weapons emplacements were dug in all required areas, and numerous other projects were completed.
[Many of the existing facilities SOG renovated had been inherited from the French.]
(TSLD) Appendix III contains the historical summaries of the operational aspects of OPLAN 34A.
Section 1 -- Maritime Operations
1. (TS) Summary of Operations. The current means of identifying types of MAROPS missions is by number, -- Material Deleted -- The current mission designation method was adopted midway through CY-66. However, the code names are used throughout this report to simplify identification. These code names are defined as follows:
b. -- Word Deleted -- Separately scheduled Nasty Class PTF -- Words Deleted -- interdiction mission wherein NVN vessels encountered in the patrol area are stopped, bearded, and searched. -- WORDS Deleted -- If cargo of a military nature is found, vessel is destroyed.
c. -- All of C is Deleted -
[The deletion refers to the fact that the hull is composed of a layer of fiberglass sandwiched between sheets of mahogany. The boats were initially built in Norway, and MACSOG 's reason for classifying the hull composition remains an unsolved mystery./
Date: CY 1966
-- Section Deleted -
(1) No MAROPS were conducted in 1966 until 17 February, at which time a 55-day JCS-ordered stand down was terminated. -- Sentences Deleted -
(2) Coastal guns engaged MAROPS craft frequently and as PTF assets decreased through operational attrition, missions were scheduled with a definite view toward conserving PTF assets on hand. Nevertheless, missions were executed along the entire NVN coast and over one-half of the total MAROPS missions conducted in 1966 were executed north of 19:00 N.
(3)- Name Deleted -- relieved -- Name Deleted -- as the Chief, MAROPS on 24 April. - Name Deleted -- relieved -- Name Deleted as Operations Officer, MAROPS on 6 June. Lieutenant Colonel Butler relieved -- Name Deleted - as Plans Officer, MAROPS on 6 July. -- Name Deleted -- relieved -- Name Deleted -- as Assistant Operations Officer, MAROPS on 4 August. -- Name Deleted -- relieved Lieutenant Commander -- Name Deleted -- as Operations Officer, MAROPS on 20 November.
(4) Commander -- Name Deleted -- relieved -- Name Deleted -- as Officer in Charge, USNAD on 1 May.
(5) On 31 July the Chief, Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, approved the TO&E for the naval element of the Coastal Security Service. Approved strength was set at 362 Vietnamese Naval personnel. An average of 11 PTF crews composed of Vietnamese Naval personnel were operationally ready throughout the year. -- Material Deleted -
(6)- Deleted -
(7) PTF operational status varied due to material casualties and operational losses. Three new Nasty Class PTFs were acquired in 1966. All three of these boats were subsequently lost during the year. The inventory at the beginning of the year consisted of nine Nasty Class PTFs. At the end of 1966 seven Nasty Class PTFs were in the SOG inventory.
An average of seven Nasty Class PTFs were operationally ready throughout the year. At the end of 1966 the status of replacement PTFs was reflected in a JCS message which stated that the Trumpy Boat Yard, Annapolis, Maryland, had been awarded a contract to build six Nasty Class PTFs with first delivery in 18 months.
2. (TS) Operations:
[The deleted sections probably refer to VNN interference and the lack of coordination between SOG and non-SOG U.S. maritime support assets. SOG's problems with both the VNN and non-SOG support assets would continue throughout its lifetime.]
b. The operational areas available to the MAROPS craft became increasingly -- Sentence Deleted -- a USN NGF/interdiction operation employing USN destroyers to engage military cargo vessels and active military coastal installations. By the end of 1966 Sea Dragon had extended north to 18:00 N. Additionally -- Words Deleted -- restricting MAROPS craft to areas south of l9.30N so as not to expose PTFs to known operating areas of NVN air. PTFs had been attacked in northern waters by enemy air in 1966 without possessing adequate air defense weapons. -- Sentences Deleted -
[Sea Dragon operations were permitted between the 17th and 20th parallels (NVN). Sea Dragon consisted of naval surface operations against NVN military/logistic watercraft and against suitable targets in NVN ashore north of 20 degrees N latitude to the redefined buffer zone (DMZ). 'Suitable targets' included coastal radar and missile sites.
The advantages foreseen by an expansion of Sea Dragon operations were apparent. Simply stated, MACSOG/34A forces would be able to interdict coastal water traffic and reduce the use of land LOCs by harassing gunfire. The risks, however, were formidable.
It was considered entirely possible that, if Sea Dragon expanded radically, U.S. 34A forces would face possible naval and air reactions by NVN in northern waters, together with the ever increasing likelihood that Red Chinese and Soviet patrol craft (and PRC/Soviet crews) might be drawn into the conflict.
Nonetheless, plans were drawn to expand the Sea Dragon concept to include valid military targets ashore south of 19 degrees N Forces engaged in Sea Dragon up to this point in the war required extensive authorization for offensive action against shore targets.
The most ambitious and far-ranging plans included provisions for
action by MAROPS craft above the 20th parallel. Coastal targets between
the 17th and 22nd parallels were:
a. Hon Gio
a. Hon Gio
The advantages of such actions were interdiction of coastal water traffic and the reduction of land LOCs.
The physical risks assessed for all of these actions were considered only minimal beyond normal combat. The political risks vacillated between low - since US ships were already firing against shore targets in self-defense and against waterborne logistic craft beached and in rivers -- and high, with Soviet and CHICOM direct action anticipated. Clearly, MACSOG 34A Maritime operations were the star of the show from 1964 through 1967.]
3. (TS) Training:
b. Boat Crew Training. Cyclic and refresher training continued whenever boat availability and operational requirements permitted. Individual and multiple boat tactics as well as gunnery and fire discipline were stressed. Proper communication procedures were emphasized constantly as was the proper use of recognition procedures. The Mobile Support Team began a program of training all Vietnamese engineering ratings in maintenance and repair of the Napier-Deltic engines, the propulsion system of the Nasty PTF.
4. (TS) Equipment -- Deleted -
5. (TS) Facilities:
b. In the summer of 1966 the action team base camp construction at Black Rock was completed. Action Teams were relocated at this camp from their individual camps in the vicinity of My Khe. These camps were turned over to the Da Nang Real Estate Directorate for other than SOG use. U.S. SEAL advisors continued to be based at My Khe with their move to Black Rock scheduled in CY-67. In the fall of 1966 an explosion of unknown origin extensively damaged the My Khe camp. Repairs were effected; however, no rebuilding of facilities was undertaken since all activities will be transferred to Black Rock during first of CY-67.